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SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 43 SUMMER 1992 NUMBER 4
FOREWORD
LAWRENCE P. KING*
This Symposium issue of the South Carolina Law Review entitled
"The Trustee's Avoiding Powers" is a welcome addition to legal litera-
ture generally and to the mass of writings concerning* bankruptcy law
specifically. On the whole, the various articles contained in this issue
bring together related subjects concerning the ability of a trustee or a
debtor in possession in a case under title 11 of the United States Code
(the Bankruptcy Code) to set aside transfers of property made by a
debtor prior to the filing of a petition commencing the case.
The ability of the trustee (or debtor in possession in a Chapter 11
case)1 furthers one of the two basic purposes of the Bankruptcy Code
as a whole. That purpose is to provide a means and a mechanism that
,promotes the equitable distribution of the debtor's property among the
debtor's unsecured creditors.2 Obviously, if a debtor were freely per-
mitted to transfer property at any time prepetition, by any means and
* Charles Seligson Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Counsel,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, N.Y. LL.B. 1953, New York University;
LL.M. 1957, University of Michigan.
1. All of the avoiding power sections give to the trustee the particular right and
standing to assert the power of avoidance. In a Chapter 11 case there ordinarily is no
trustee; rather, the debtor in possession manages the property and conducts the business
of the estate. Accordingly, § 1107 gives the debtor in possession the rights and powers of
a trustee and it, therefore, can assert the avoiding powers contained in Chapter 5 of the
Bankruptcy Code. In this Foreword, whenever "trustee" is used, it includes "debtor in
possession," unless the context requires otherwise.
2. The other basic purpose of the U.S. bankruptcy laws is to give'the honest debtor
a fresh start, which is accomplished through the mechanism of the bankruptcy discharge.
That goal is not involved in the subject matter of this Symposium.
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under any circumstances, a somewhat dishonest debtor or one who
wanted to play favorites would be able to do its own choosing and
leave little or nothing for its general body of creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code has a variety of provisions that restrict the
effectiveness of prebankruptcy transfers. Several of them are discussed
in the following articles. It should be noted at the outset, however, that
not all of the weapons in the trustee's arsenal to avoid transfers for the
benefit of the estate are included in this Symposium. Among the exclu-
sions are the powers of the trustee under sections 542,1 543,4 545,5 and
even 365.8 What is included, in general for present purposes, are dis-
cussions of some problems with respect to recovering fraudulent con-
veyances, voidable preferences, and setoffs.
In his solo article entitled Reception of the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, Professor Frank R. Kennedy has given the reader of and
researcher using this Symposium very helpful information concerning
the evolution, enactment, and utility of the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA). As he notes, it has been adopted in twenty-nine
states since 1984, which is a rather remarkable statistic. That is a large
number of states to enact a uniform piece of legislation in such a short
period of time. The UFTA is an updated version of what many states
had earlier enacted as the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA). Professor Kennedy indicates the changes that the newer
makes from the older and, with characteristic objectivity (he served as
the reporter for the UFTA), he indicates the critical comments that
have been generated by some of the changes and provisions of the
newer. This article also contains helpful citations to cases that have
involvement with important provisions in the Act. For anyone who has
to use the UFTA, for whatever purpose, Professor Kennedy's article is
highly recommended for the background that it contains and its ex-
planatory insights into the workings of that statute.
in the jointly authored article by Professor Kennedy and Gerald
K. Smith, Esquire, Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of
Current Interest, specific and very current problems that are plaguing
the courts are discussed and solutions with respect to them are offered.
Both authors bolster the discussion of the problems and their conclu-
3. Section 542 permits the trustee to obtain property of the estate held by another
under certain circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1988).
4. Section 543 permits the trustee to recover property from a "custodian" under
certain circumstances. Id. § 543.
5. Section 545 contains the provisions that allow the avoidance of statutory liens.
Id. § 545.
6. Section 365 deals with the assumption and rejection of executory contracts. Al-
though not strictly an avoiding power, it allows the trustee the option of nonperformance
or requiring performance of prepetition contracts. Id. § 365 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
[Vol. 43
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sions on how they should be resolved by their actual experience in
some of the cases in which the issues have been raised. Thus, what too
often is lacking in the legal literature-that is, practical application of
esoteric discussions-can be found in this article. Not only are sugges-
tions set forth for resolution, they are directed specifically to the courts
and offered without any expression of doubt as to their accuracy. Thus,
should the practitioner have a case in which such an issue exists, not
only has the brief been written but all of the research has been done.
All the practitioner need do is push the appropriate button to update
the research. As only one illustration, the authors note that section
546(a) of the Bankruptcy Code has been interpreted by some courts to
impose a two-year limitation on a Chapter 11 debtor in possession to
bring an action under one of the avoiding powers. That section, how-
ever, refers only to a trustee and runs the two-year period from the
time of appointment of the trustee under section 1104. A debtor in
possession is not appointed under section 1104 and for this, and other
reasons set forth in the article, the authors rightfully conclude that the
two-year period should be inapplicable to a debtor in possession.
The article by Michael L. Cook, Esquire, The Judicially Created
"Innocent Shareholder" Defense to Constructive Fraudulent Transfer
Liability in Failed Leveraged Buyouts, continues the discussion of
fraudulent conveyances in an even more specific context. First, it '
should be recognized that the trustee has two shots at using fraudulent
conveyance law: that contained in the state statutes, e.g., the UFTA or
UFCA, which are brought into a bankruptcy case by virtue of section
544(b),7 or the Bankruptcy Code's own version of fraudulent convey-
ance law which is contained in section 548.8 The specific instance that
is the subject of Cook's well thought out piece is the leveraged buyout
and actions to recover from shareholders the benefits that they re-
ceived. Only two or three cases have reached the courts on the issue of
shareholder liability, one of which is a court of appeals decision,9 and
Mr. Cook looks at both the reasoning of the cases and the applicable
7. Section 544(b) gives to the trustee the rights of an unsecured creditor in exis-
tence on the date of the filing of the petition; if that creditor could, under state law,
avoid a fraudulent conveyance, the trustee may assert that right and use the same law to
avoid the conveyance. Id. § 544(b) (1988).
8. Section 548 permits the trustee, qua trustee, to avoid a fraudulent conveyance as
defined in that section if it occurred within one year prior to the filing of the petition. Id.
§ 548 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Under § 544(b) the trustee may use the applicable state
statute of limitations. Id. § 544(b) (1988).
9. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230
(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992); see also Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d
842 (9th Cir. 1988); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 131 B.R. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
1992]
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Bankruptcy Code provisions. It seems clear that he does not fully ap-
prove of the safe harbor contained for shareholders in section 546(e) of
the Code, but he would agree that the Code is clear in its solution, and
change, if needed, should come from Congress and not the courts. This
is a refreshing attitude as contrasted with too many court decisions in
the bankruptcy area in which the judges, from the bankruptcy courts
to the courts of appeals, liken themselves unto legislators.
Professor John C. McCoid II, in Corporate Preferences to Insid-
ers, reexamines the concepts of insider liability and preference liability
as they presently. exist in the Bankruptcy Code. As at present, section
547(b) permits a reach back of one year for payments or preferential
transfers to insiders if the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer. As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Code required the in-
sider to know or reasonably have knowledge that the debtor was insol-
vent at the date of the transfer if that date was more than ninety days
and less than one year before the filing of the petition. His examina-
tion goes to the central issue of legitimacy of the transfer.
Professor McCoid indicates that he does not have a quarrel with
the present provision that sets a different time for the avoidance of
insider preferences from the time set forth for the avoidance of trans-
fers to noninsiders. What he proposes is that the emphasis should be
on whether the transfer or repayment actually constituted an injury to
the debtor, that is, was the transfer in the best interest of the debtor.
He points out that in a bankruptcy case, at least, because of the collec-
tive nature of the case itself, when a preference is recovered, the
preferee is placed in the same position as the rest of the unsecured
creditors and will share pro rata on the revived claim; however, if a
preference against insiders is recoverable under state law, it can be at
the instance of an individual creditor who would then achieve the pre-
ferred position, at least vis-a-vis the insider. This appears lacking in
soundness of doctrine. The article is an interesting excursion into the
several issues of insider guarantees and will stimulate further debate.
Professor David Gray Carlson takes on a discussion of section
544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code in his article entitled The Trustee's
Strong Arm Power Under the Bankruptcy Code. In the first portion of
the article he briefly describes the historical development of section
544(a), tracing its forebears through its immediate lineage of section
70c of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 together with some of the interpre-
tive problems of that former section. In the second portion of his arti-
cle he expounds on the question that he raises about whether the
strong arm power avoids the transfer it attacks, e.g., avoids a security
interest in a debtor's property that was not perfected at the date of the
filing of the petition as against a judicial lien creditor under appropri-
ate state law, or whether it merely subordinates the secured claim of
that creditor to the trustee. He rightfully acknowledges that in the
[Vol. 43
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multitude of instances there will be no difference in the result. Profes-
sor Carlson does, however, posit one situation, that of a nonrecourse
security interest, in which a difference may eventuate and therefore
permit a problem worthy of discussion.
Subordination, of course, comes into play when section 551 may be
used by the trustee. Under that section an avoided transfer is automat-
ically preserved for the benefit of the estate when it is in the interest of
the estate for it to be done. That situation will arise when the holder of
the avoided transfer has superior rights in property to those of another
whose interest is not avoidable by the trustee. Instead of giving the
junior interest holder a windfall by elevating its rights, section 551 pre-
serves the priority of the avoided transfer and permits its exercise by
the trustee. In this sense, one can speak of subordination and the au-
thor presents interesting hypotheticals to spell out the relationships
and interrelationships that can become involved, all of which makes for
interesting reading and contemplation. Professor Carlson continues his
discussion into the Chapter 11 plan confirmation area.
Professor Carlson's article goes into the other provisions of section
544(a), such as the provision that grants the trustee the rights of the
judicial lien creditor as of the date of the filing of the petition and
assumes that credit is extended on that same date, as well as the trus-
tee's status as a bona fide purchaser of real property, also at the date
of the filing of the petition. In addition, he discusses those cases that
disallow the trustee to avoid transfers under the strong arm clause. In
all, the article is a thorough treatment and analysis of a most impor-
tant avoiding power of the trustee.
Dean Philip T. Lacy has written an article that discusses the setoff
right and limitations contained in section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code.
It is entitled Setoff and the Principle of Creditor Equality. In this
article he examines the criticisms that have been levelled at the Bank-
ruptcy Code's recognition of the setoff right, albeit encouraging its
nonuse by awarding the creditor with a secured claim in a title 11 case
to the extent of the right of the setoff if it had not been exercised prior
to the filing of the petition.10 Dean Lacy suggests and pointedly notes
that the Bankruptcy Code's treatment is consistent with the underly-
ing policies of the trustee's other avoiding powers, particularly that
dealing with preferences. What has to be recognized is that Congress
started with the policy of referring to state law for the right of setoff.
Congress did not write a law of setoff in the Bankruptcy Code just as it
did not write a law of setoff in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. In the
10. Section 553 permits the exercise of the right of setoff if the creditor has such a
right under state law; § 506(a) converts that right, if it had not been exercised prepeti-
tion, to a secured claim postpetition. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
1992]
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Bankruptcy Code it continued a recognition of the right of a creditor
to setoff but only under circumstances in which it would have such a
right absent a case under the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to the for-
mer bankruptcy law, the exercise of the right could occur up to the
point of the filing of the petition and in a number of Chapter XI cases,
banks setoff a debtor's loan against its bank account, leaving nothing
for the debtor to work with in the ensuing Chapter XI case. In the
Bankruptcy Code Congress attempted to ameliorate this situation
somewhat and balance off the interests involved. Thus, the encourage-
ment not to setoff and the concomitant loss if a setoff occurs and there
is a betterment in position during the ninety days preceding the filing
of the petition.
Professor Charles Jordan Tabb follows with a general discussion of
preferences in Rethinking Preferences. I am not sure that anyone who
went through the various amendments to former section 60 of the 1898
Bankruptcy Act in the 1950s, the consideration of it that resulted from
the inclusion of the floating lien in Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code in the 1960s, and the hearings and drafting and final enact-
ment of section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code as well as its becoming
effective in the 1970s will want to do any rethinking about it in the
1990s. Fortunately, a respite existed in the 1980s and, perhaps, that is
all to which one is entitled.
Professor Tabb takes on the ordinary course of business exception
in section 547(c)(2) and concludes that it should be eliminated. Per-
haps it should, but two problems immediately spring to mind. The
business community would be up in arms. Therefore, something would
have to replace it. What could that be? It should be remembered that
all of subsection (c) is new to the Bankruptcy Code; it was made neces-
sary by the elimination of the former element necessary to recover a
voidable preference, which was that the transferee had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the trans-
fer. This was not carried forward in the Bankruptcy Code because it
was too hard to prove and because (almost a cause and effect) it was
illogical to the underlying policy of avoiding preferences. But, its elimi-
nation required something in its place if one did not wish to invalidate
every single transfer (payment) during the critical period. Congress did
not wish to do this; therefore, it included subsection (c) as a laundry
list of exceptions to the voidable preferences that a trustee could actu-
ally avoid.
The author discusses the issues surrounding the way in which sec-
tion 547(c)(2) came to be written and amended, and now interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Wolas.1' Subsection (c)(2)
11. 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
[Vol. 43
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should be revisited by Congress, but whether it should be repealed in
its entirety is questionable. A good thought to leave the subject with is
that all of subsection (c) should be repealed and in its place a simple
provision could be added to the effect that the trustee must prove, to
recover a transfer that is voidable under section 547(b), that, at the
time of the transfer, the transferee had reasonable cause to believe that
the debtor was insolvent!
Finally, Professor Lester Brickman tackles the matter of retainer
fees in cases under the Bankruptcy Code in The Use of Advance Fee
Attorney Retainer Agreements in Bankruptcy: Another Special Law
for Lawyers? As his article points out, the matter of debtors' counsel
obtaining prepetition retainers under a variety of agreements has come
under scrutiny by bankruptcy courts and not all pass muster.
One matter that should be kept in mind by the courts and discus-
sants is that the Bankruptcy Code takes a very emphatic and affirma-
tive approach in setting forth the supervisory function of the bank-
ruptcy judge when it comes to payments made by a debtor to an
attorney prior to the filing of the petition. That role transcends a trus-
tee's avoiding powers. If the attorney received a payment for services
already rendered, the trustee may be able to recover the payment as a
voidable preference under section 547. But the term "preference" has
nothing to do with the court's power to review a prepetition payment
to the debtor's attorney for a determination of reasonableness. It
should not matter what the form of the payment was, what kind of a
retainer agreement was entered into, or what the specific provisions of
the agreement were. Section 329 of the Bankruptcy Code gives to the
court all the power it needs and, as a general rule, particularly when
called to the court's attention, courts are not loathe to exercise the
power. Sometimes, the key is calling it to the attention of the court;
creditors should be on active guard as should the United States
trustee.
Professor Brickman has done a service to the bar generally, as well
as to a greater public audience, by calling this matter to everyone's
attention and by proffering well thought out solutions.
The editors of the South Carolina Law Review are to be congratu-
lated for a job extremely well done. They have garnered together a host
of first rate authors who have contributed with unanimity first rate
articles, each requiring one to think about important issues and even
rethink well-established positions. In addition, the editors prepared
and successfully carried off a live Symposium in which all of the au-
thors discussed their articles. The live Symposium, on March 20, 1992,
in Columbia, South Carolina, was very well received by the members of
the bar and bench who attended. I wish the editors well and, based on
prior performance, I am sure that their legal careers in whatever form
will bring them much success and happiness.
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